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I. INTRODUCTION

The phrase "equal justice" has dubious meaning for persons
with disabilities who seek redress of employment discrimination in
court. After experiencing job loss and facing relatively slim chances of
reemployment, many of these individuals seek judicial recognition
that their employers failed to accommodate their disabilities. Yet the
1245
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vast majority of plaintiffs who bring employment discrimination
lawsuits under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") lose. In
2006, employers prevailed in 212 of the 272 cases that went to trial in
federal court.1 Some commentators point to the high win rates for
employers as evidence of judicial frustration with the volume of ADA
litigation. 2 Indeed, the ADA is arguably one of the most frustrating
federal statutes for courts and one that has generated interpretive
confusion with record speed. Many employees seek the statute's
protection. In 2007, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") received over 17,000 disability discrimination complaints,
yet found reasonable cause for discrimination in only five percent of
3
them.
Many ADA plaintiffs also seek the protection of another,
considerably older federal statute: the Social Security Act ("SSA").
Receipt of disability benefits under the SSA makes a successful ADA
claim even more difficult. ADA plaintiffs must prove that they could
perform the essential functions of their jobs, with or without
reasonable accommodations. 4 If a disability renders someone
completely unable to do a job, there is no recourse under the ADA. 5 By
contrast, a successful Social Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI")
6
claim hinges on an applicant's inability to work.
The ostensible mutual exclusivity of the statutes has proven
invaluable to employers by permitting them to argue that ADA
plaintiffs who receive SSDI plead the impossible: they are both able
and unable to do their jobs. Capitalizing on the statutory conflict,
employers' counsel often invoke judicial estoppel, a doctrine that
1.
Amy L. Allbright, 2006 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I-Survey Update, 31
MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 328, 328 (2007); see also Amy L. Allbright, 2005
Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I-Survey Update, 30 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 492, 492 (2006) (finding that out of 401 ADA employment discrimination
cases brought in federal court in 2005, 288 resulted in employer victories via summary judgment
or motions to dismiss); Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for
Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 109 (1999) (analyzing 615 trial court ADA cases
during the period 1992-1998 and finding that employers prevailed in 92.7%, including 38.7% on
summary judgment).
2.
See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination
Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 451-52 (2004) (concluding
that "district courts process employment discrimination cases with a neutral or even jaundiced
eye toward plaintiffs," and that plaintiffs fare even worse in appellate courts).
3.

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF

1990 (ADA) CHARGES: FY 1997-FY 2008, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-charges.html (last visited
Apr. 15, 2009).
4.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2006).
5.
See id. (defining a "qualified individual" as one who can perform the essential functions
of the employment position that such individual holds or desires).
6.
Id. § 423(d)(1)(A).
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prevents a party who prevailed on an assertion in a legal proceeding
from benefiting from a contradictory assertion in a subsequent legal
proceeding. 7 Rarely raised compared to other preclusion doctrines like
res judicata and collateral estoppel,8 judicial estoppel has gained
currency against plaintiffs who seek the protection of the ADA after
being awarded disability benefits. 9 The risk that SSDI will preclude
an ADA claim puts a plaintiff in the unenviable position of choosing
between financial support after a job loss and redressing the allegedly
unlawful employer action that caused the need for government
support. For most ADA plaintiffs, however, "choice" is a misnomer;
judicial estoppel is a trap for those who simply could not have
imagined that a court would deem redressing discrimination and
obtaining minimal financial assistance to be inconsistent and even
unlawful goals.
In 1999, the Supreme Court tried to resolve the lower courts'
varying applications of judicial estoppel to ADA and SSDI claims.10 In
Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., the Court held that
receipt of SSDI is not an automatic bar to an ADA claim.1 1 Plaintiffs
must, however, offer a "sufficient explanation" for the apparent
inconsistency to avoid summary judgment. 12 Although hailed as a
victory for ADA plaintiffs, Cleveland still allows employers to win
summary judgment when employees receive disability benefits and
fail to offer a satisfactory explanation. 13 While some plaintiffs awarded
SSDI are able to proceed with ADA claims,1 4 the continued invocation
of judicial estoppel raises questions about the doctrine's appeal in this
particular statutory context.
Judicial estoppel does possess a certain logical appeal. On the
surface, the statutory conflict between the ADA and the SSA puts
claimants in the contradictory position of pleading that they are both
7.
Kira A. Davis, Note, JudicialEstoppel and Inconsistent Positions of Law Applied to Fact
and Pure Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 191, 192 (2003).
8.
See infra Part II.C.
9.
Lawrence B. Solum, Caution! Estoppel Ahead: Cleveland v. Policy Management
Systems Corporation, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 461, 463, 473 (1999).
10. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 800 (1999).
11. Id. at 807.
12.

Id.

13. See, e.g., Hidalgo v. Bloomingdale's, No. 98 Civ. 9016, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12433, at
*18 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2002) (holding that plaintiffs who received SSDI were not "qualified
individuals" under the ADA), affd, 62 F. App'x 412 (2d Cir. 2003); Lorde v. City of Philadelphia,
No. 98-5267, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17196, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2000) (same).
14. See, e.g., Adams v. TRW Auto. U.S. L.L.C., No. 3:03-1240, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39636,
at *42 (M.D. Tenn. July 22, 2005) (declining to award summary judgment to employers on ADA
claims although the plaintiffs had received SSDI); Nodelman v. Gruner & Jahr USA Publ'g, No.
98 Civ. 1231, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5398, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2000) (same).

1248

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 62:4:1245

able and unable to work. Applying judicial estoppel allows courts to
express frustration with this conflict and eliminate unmeritorious
claims relatively quickly. However, as this Note demonstrates, judicial
estoppel is rarely a statutorily faithful way to approach the ADA.
Further, true conflicts between SSA and ADA claims are rare,
provided that courts are willing to dig beneath the superficial appeal
of the vintage judicial estoppel doctrine. The crucial questions,
regardless of the receipt of SSDI, are whether ADA plaintiffs
requested accommodations from their employers and whether
employers discriminated against these employees because of their
disabilities. Eager application of judicial estoppel risks overlooking
these elements.
Many commentators-before and after Cleveland-criticized
the application of judicial estoppel to the ADA and SSA. 15 While this
Note addresses how receipt of disability benefits is not inconsistent
with the ability to work, its purpose is not to reiterate the differences
between the SSA and ADA. Rather, it examines how federal courts
have analyzed this conflict since Cleveland, observing that courts
continue to find irreconcilable conflicts between ADA and SSDI
claims, often through overly formalistic or technical analyses. Because
many ADA plaintiffs apply for SSDI upon losing their jobs, 16 the
15. See Matthew Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies: The Tensions Between the Americans
with DisabilitiesAct and Federal Disability Benefit Programs, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1003, 1048 (1998)
(arguing that judicial estoppel reinforces a binary view by suggesting that the ADA protects only
persons with disabilities who can work and that the SSA protects only those who cannot work);
Christine Neylon O'Brien, To Tell the Truth: Should Judicial Estoppel PrecludeAmericans with
Disabilities Act Complaints?, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 349, 372 (1999) (arguing that judicial
estoppel should be abandoned and that receipt of disability benefits may instead be admissible
evidence); Solum, supra note 9, at 496 (arguing that judicial estoppel is no longer a valid doctrine
under liberal notice pleading standards); Jessica Barth, Note, Disability Benefits and the ADA
After Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems, 75 IND. L.J. 1317, 1347 (2000) (arguing that
Cleveland's flexible approach "allows continued lower-court hostility to the ADA and perpetuates
unpredictability for ADA plaintiffs"); Anne E. Beaumont, Note, This Estoppel Has Got to Stop:
Judicial Estoppel and the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1529, 1577 (1996)
(arguing that despite the "superficial logical appeal" of judicial estoppel, it "absolves courts of the
obligation to engage in thorough statutory interpretation" and "perpetuates negative
stereotypes" about persons with disabilities); Marney Collins Sims, Comment, Estop It!: Judicial
Estoppel and its Use in Americans with DisabilitiesAct Litigation, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 843, 870
(1997) (arguing also against the use of judicial estoppel as a per se bar to ADA claims and
proposing that receipt of disability benefits be considered as evidence). But see Kimberly Jane
Houghton, Commentary, Having Total Disability and Claiming It, Too: The EEOC's Position
Against the Use of Judicial Estoppel in Americans with DisabilitiesAct Cases May Hurt More
than It Helps, 49 ALA. L. REV. 645, 672 (1998) (arguing that judicial estoppel may prevent
employees from "extort[ing] damages from employers" and preserves "the integrity of [ADA]
claims").
16. See David H. Autor & Mark G. Duggan, The Rise in the Disability Rolls and the Decline
in Unemployment, 118 Q.J. ECON. 157, 159 (2003) (observing that because "nonemployment is a
de facto precondition for disability application," most persons only seek SSDI after job loss).
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conflict will continue to arise. Requiring plaintiffs to disentangle the
statutory and administrative schemes communicates a message of
forfeiture: by excusing themselves from the societal obligation to work,
plaintiffs have forfeited their right to redress under the ADA. Further,
by taking plaintiffs' statements made to the Social Security
Administration outside of their administrative context, judicial
estoppel diverts attention from employers' alleged discriminatory
actions, 17 making it appear that the employer was "disability-blind"
while the employee self-identified as a person unable to contribute to
the economy.
Part II of this Note provides background on the relevant
provisions of the ADA and SSA, the judicial estoppel doctrine, and
Cleveland's conclusion on the statutory conflict. Part III analyzes how
courts have approached the conflict since Cleveland, observing that
they often apply overly formalistic analyses to meeting Cleveland's
resolve-the-inconsistency standard. For example, one major loophole
the Supreme Court deliberately left open, the difference between
contrary factual assertions and contrary legal assertions,1 8 has kept
judicial estoppel alive. Part IV suggests that when harmonizing the
statutes, courts should look for discrimination within the specific
employment relationship rather than search for indications of
accommodations within SSDI applications. Part V concludes by
addressing how a more careful assessment of the interplay between
the ADA and SSA better serves the adjudicatory integrity that judicial
estoppel aims to protect.

II. BACKGROUND: THE CONFLICTING STATUTORY SCHEME
A. The Americans with DisabilitiesAct
Congress passed the ADA in 1990 to prohibit "discrimination
against disabled individuals in employment and public transportation,
accommodations, and services."1 9 Title I, which covers employment,
prohibits employers from "discriminat[ing] against a qualified
17. Diller, supra note 15, at 1057. Diller criticizes courts' overemphasis on the fixed status
of ADA plaintiffs' medical conditions and argues that this tendency is heightened in the context
of judicial estoppel: "The focus on the severity of the plaintiffs medical condition also means that
the center of attention remains on the plaintiff, rather than on the conduct of the employer. The
'abnormality' still holds center stage, rather than the structure of institutions or the social
response to the impairment." Id.
18. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 802 (1999).
19. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006)).
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individual with a disability because of the disability" in regard to job
application and hiring procedures, terms of employment, and
termination." 20 The ADA defines disability in three ways: (1) having "a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of such individual"; (2) having "a record of
such an impairment"; or (3) being "regarded as having such an
impairment."2 1 Crucial to this Note's solution is the "regarded as"
definition, which protects employees from the mistaken assumptions
22
of their employers.
A prima facie case of employment discrimination under the
ADA requires the plaintiff to show that she (1) meets at least one of
the three above definitions of "disabled"; (2) is a "qualified individual";
and (3) suffered adverse employment action because of her disability. 23
A qualified individual is one "with a disability who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that the individual holds or desires." 24 The
ADA's legislative history reveals Congress's intent that the relevant
moment to assess whether an individual is "qualified" is the time of an
adverse employment action, such as a job termination-not the time of
litigation. 2 5 Isolating this timeframe is essential to discerning whether
receipt of SSDI is inconsistent with an ADA claim.
Simply having a disability does not trigger ADA protection. A
successful ADA claim requires that a person be able to perform the
essential job functions despite the disability. The quid pro quo is that
an employer must provide reasonable accommodations to make that
performance possible. 26 Judicial estoppel stops the inquiry at the

20. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
21. Id. Recent ADA amendments, which went into effect on January 1, 2009, expanded the
definition of disability. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
Although courts have had little time to interpret these amendments, they should not affect this
Note's analysis because the definition of "qualified individual," which is at issue in a judicial
estoppel analysis, was not changed by the amendments.
22. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999) (observing that the "regarded
as" definition of disabled applies when employers "entertain misperceptions about the
individual... misperceptions [that] often 'result from stereotypic assumptions not truly
indicative of ... individual ability'" (internal citations omitted)); see also Diller, supra note 15, at
1020 ("The ADA is rooted on the premise that many barriers to employment ...
stem from
prejudice, rather than from limitations imposed by medical conditions.").
23. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
24. Id. § 12111(8).
25. H.R. REP. No. 101-485 (III), at 34 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 456 ("The
determination of whether a person is qualified should be made at the time of the employment
action... and should not be based on the possibility that the employee or applicant will become
incapacitated and unqualified in the future.").
26. See supra note 5 (defining "qualified individual").
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question of job qualification. By doing so, it diverts attention from the
crucial question of whether the individual suffered adverse
employment action because of a disability and onto the seeming
affront of applying for government benefits premised on inability to
work. Yet as this Note shows, this question of whether adverse action
occurred because of an individual's disability is closely linked to
whether judicial estoppel is appropriate. How an employer treats an
employee may inform how the employee characterizes her medical
conditions to the Social Security Administration.
B. The Social Security Act
Unlike the ADA, the focus of the SSA is on the individual's
inability to work at all. Since 1956, the SSA has provided long-term
income support for individuals deemed too disabled to work. 2 7 In 2007,
the Social Security Administration paid approximately 7.8 billion
dollars in disability benefits to 8.1 million people, ninety percent of
whom were disabled workers. 28 The SSA defines disability as the
"inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of
any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can
be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected
to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 29 To receive
SSDI, the impairment must be of "such severity that [an individual] is
not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his
age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of
30
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy."
Because SSDI eligibility requires both an inability to do one's previous
job and any "substantial gainful work," a successful claim seemingly
establishes that a person is wholly unable to work, and therefore is
not a "qualified individual" under the ADA. Indeed, some courts have
emphasized the SSA's economy-at-large definition of disability to
31
justify judicial estoppel of ADA claims.
27.

Diller, supra note 15, at 1005.

28. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT ON THE SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY
INSURANCE PROGRAM,
2007
(2008),
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/diasr/2007

/index.html#highlights [hereinafter 2007 ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT].
29. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
30. Id. § 423(d)(2)(A).
31. See, e.g., Hindman v. Greenville Hosp. Sys., 947 F. Supp. 215, 222 (D.S.C. 1996)
("Indisputably, [Plaintiff] obtained disability benefits from the SSA because she was declared
'totally disabled'.. .. In reaching this conclusion, the SSA observed that [Plaintiff] ... labored
under a considerable disability that severely impaired her ability to work, which of course
precluded substantial gainful employment."); Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 911 F. Supp. 1351,
1359 (D. Kan. 1995) ("In light of the fact that the SSA explained to the plaintiff that to be
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As some courts recognized even before Cleveland, the SSA,
unlike the ADA, does not consider whether the applicant's employer
could have provided a particular accommodation to enable job
performance. 32 SSDI claims are heard in an informal administrative
setting that employs a standardized, five-step procedure to make
disability determinations. 33 The SSA's five questions are: (1) is the
applicant working? (generally, working applicants are ineligible); (2) is
the applicant's condition severe?; (3) is the condition included among
the SSA's list of automatically disabling conditions?; (4) can the
applicant do his or her prior work?; and (5), if not, is there any work
that the applicant can do given his or her medical conditions, work
34
experience, age, education, and skills?
Beyond these statutory and administrative differences, SSDI
awards may be misunderstood on a more general level as signaling a
total inability to work. Professor Matthew Diller argues that SSDI
awards are more accurately described as socioeconomic judgments, not
objective medical determinations; they signify "that an individual is
excused from the social obligation to work because to work would
require effort or impose hardship that is greater than that which
society expects people to endure." 35 As Diller contends, SSDI awards
bear an implicit conclusion that social and economic forces, such as a

'disabled' one must be not only unable to perform his usual work, but any substantial gainful
work, the plaintiff cannot now [avoid judicial estoppel]."), rev'd, 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999).
32. See, e.g., Aldrich v. Boeing Co., 146 F.3d 1265, 1268 (10th Cir. 1998) ("The Social
Security Act ... does not take into consideration whether an accommodation would render the
individual able to perform a job."); Downs v. Hawkeye Health Servs., Inc., 148 F.3d 948, 951 (8th
Cir. 1998) ("[T]he Social Security disability standard does not take into account ability to work
with a reasonable accommodation."); Swanks v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582,
583 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting that SSDI determinations do not consider reasonable
accommodations), aff'd after remand, 179 F.3d 929, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
33. Beaumont, supra note 15, at 1548, 1567; see also Nodelman v. Gruner & Jahr USA
Publ'g, No. 98 Civ. 1231, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5398, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2000) (noting
that the SSA's five-step analysis "inevitably leads to a superficial understanding of the
applicant's disability").
34. Social Security Administration, How We Decide If You Are Disabled, http://www.ssa.
gov/dibplanldqualify5.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2009).
35. Diller, supra note 15, at 1059-60 (emphasis added); see also David H. Autor & Mark G.
Duggan, The Growth in the Social Security Disability Rolls: A Fiscal Crisis Unfolding, J. ECON.
PERSP., Summer 2006, at 71, 73-74 (arguing that the SSDI screening process "hinges to a
significant extent on an applicant's employability, not just personal health, causing the program
to function much like a long-term unemployment insurance program for the unemployable").
Autor and Duggan contend that medical advances have dated the Social Security Act's original
purpose by "blurr[ing] any sharp divide that may have once existed between those who are
'totally and permanently disabled' and those who are disabled but retain some work capacity."
Autor & Duggan, supra, at 74.
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lack of available jobs and claimants' limited skills, make employment
36
unlikely but not impossible.
Amendments to the Social Security Act reflect a transition
from an incapacity model of disability to an excuse model. In 1999,
Congress enacted the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives
Improvement Act, a voluntary program that allows individuals
receiving SSDI to access vocational support services and return to
work without immediately losing their benefits. 3 7 Congress passed the
law after finding that, despite SSDI recipients' desire for employment
and the enhanced protections of the ADA, less than one-half of one
percent of recipients returned to work. 38 In his signing statement,
President Clinton remarked that the new legislation could harmonize
the ADA and SSA by "affirm[ing] the basic principle manifested in the
Americans with Disabilities Act: that all Americans should have the
same opportunity to be productive citizens." 39 Senator Edward
Kennedy commented that Ticket to Work strengthened the ADA by
showing that "disabled does not mean unable." 40 Yet as of June 2007,
41
the program's participation rate was approximately six percent,
suggesting that the ADA and SSA have not been integrated to the
extent that legislators hoped.
C. JudicialEstoppel: The Pre-Cleveland Approach
Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that prevents a party
who prevails on a claim in a legal or administrative proceeding from
42
prevailing on a contradictory claim in a subsequent proceeding. 43
Courts typically apply judicial estoppel through summary judgment.
In 2001, the Supreme Court fleshed out the doctrine's contours in New
36. Diller, supra note 15, at 1010.
37. Mark McWilliams, Disability Law-The Ticket to Work and Work Incentives and
Improvement Act: An "E"Ticket for Adults with Disabilities,79 MICH. B.J. 1680, 1682 (2000).
38. Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-170, 113
Stat. 1860 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-19 (2006)).
39. President's Statement on Signing the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement
Act of 1999, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2637 (Dec. 17, 1999).
40. Jennifer Heldt Powell, Disabled Workers Welcome New Law, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 12,
1999, at 43.
41. Barriersto Work for Individuals Receiving Social Security Disability Benefits: Hearing
Before the S. Finance Comm., 110th Cong. 1 (2007) (statement of Sen. Grassley, Ranking
Member, Senate Comm. on Finance), available at http://www.senate.gov/-finance/hearings/
statements/062107cg.pdf.
42. O'Brien, supra note 15, at 356-57.
43. Maureen C. Weston, The Road Best Traveled: Removing Judicial Roadblocks that
Prevent Workers from Obtaining both Disability Benefits and ADA Civil Rights Protection, 26
HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 384-385 (1997).
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Hampshire v. Maine, observing that the unanimously accepted
rationale for judicial estoppel is protecting the integrity of the judicial
process. 44 Unlike other forms of estoppel, the purpose of judicial
estoppel is to protect courts, not litigants; therefore, the doctrine does
not require that the non-estopped party detrimentally relied on the
prior position. 45 The phrase courts often invoke to justify judicial
estoppel is that it prevents litigants from "playing fast and loose with
46
the courts."
Lower courts have not developed a bright-line rule for when to
apply judicial estoppel. 47 One district judge has stated that "judicial
estoppel is a vintage doctrine whose popularity varies from court to
court nearly as greatly as its contours do." 48 Nonetheless, some
common elements have emerged. First, the party's subsequent
49
position must be "clearly inconsistent" with its prior position.
Second, the party actually must have prevailed on the prior position;
otherwise, there is no "risk of inconsistent determinations. '50 Finally,
courts consider whether the party asserting the inconsistent position
would "derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on
the opposing party if not estopped."51 One commentator argues that
because this last element suggests detrimental reliance, it more
appropriately falls under equitable estoppel. 52 Still, some courts
appear to require an element of unfairness by declining to judicially
53
estop a party who asserted inconsistent positions in good faith.
Until Cleveland, lower courts differed on the applicability of
judicial estoppel to the intersection of the ADA and SSA. 54 In 1992,
the Seventh Circuit articulated discomfort with the doctrine in this
statutory context, commenting that SSDI awards are "generalized"
and do not establish conclusively that there is "no work [that a]

44. 532 U.S. 742, 749-50 (2001).
45. Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 598 (6th Cir. 1982).
46. E.g., Feder v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp, 429 F.3d 125, 136 (5th Cir. 2005); Coleman v. Cmty.
Trust Bank, 426 F.3d 719, 728 (4th Cir. 2005); Wagner v. Profl Eng'rs in Cal. Gov't, 354 F.3d
1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 2004); Ergo Sci., Inc. v. Martin, 73 F.3d 595, 598 (5th Cir. 1996); Palcsesz v.
Midland Mut. Life Ins. Co., 87 F. Supp. 2d 409, 412 (D.N.J. 2000).
47. New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750.
48. Sumner v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 966 F. Supp. 1567, 1571 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
49. New Hampshire,532 U.S. at 750.
50. Id. at 750-51.
51. Id. at 751.
52. Davis, supra note 7, at 199 n.46.
53. Id. at 210.
54. See Beaumont, supra note 15, at 1555-58 (describing the various approaches courts
have taken in addressing judicial estoppel and the ADA).
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claimant can do." 55 Judicial estoppel of ADA claims gained attention
after McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., a 1996 Third Circuit decision
affirming the use of estoppel in the case of an HIV-positive ADA
plaintiff who applied for SSDI after his job termination. 56 The court
stressed the doctrine's purpose of protecting the judicial system, not
litigants. 57 Emphasizing that Congress did not intend for individuals
who are capable of working to receive SSDI, the court declared that
while choosing between disability benefits and an ADA claim may be
difficult, the hardship does not permit making "false representations
58
with impunity."
McNemar was criticized widely as an unjust application of
judicial estoppel. 59 The EEOC signaled its disapproval by issuing an
enforcement guidance explaining why SSDI is not inherently
inconsistent with the ADA.60 The EEOC emphasized that the SSA,
unlike the ADA, "permits general assumptions about an individual's
ability to work," does not closely examine the essential functions of a
61
particular job, and does not consider reasonable accommodations.
Unlike the McNemar court, the EEOC felt that individuals should not
have to choose between disability benefits and an ADA claim. 62 After
McNemar, however, some circuits adopted a rebuttable presumption of
judicial estoppel against ADA plaintiffs who received SSDI.6 3 A
minority of circuits rejected the doctrine altogether. 64
D. Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp.
In 1999, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve the confusion
in Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., a case in which the
55. Overton v. Reilly, 977 F.2d 1190, 1196 (7th Cir. 1992).
56. 91 F.3d 610, 619 (3d Cir. 1996). While McNemar has never been overruled, its ruling
was severely abrogated by a three-judge panel in Krouse v.American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494,
502-03 (3d Cir. 1997).
57. McNemar, 91 F.3d at 616-17.
58. Id. at 620.
59. Barth, supranote 15, at 1326. Soon after the decision, a Third Circuit three-judge panel
noted that while criticism of McNemar may have been "well-founded," it was not the panel's role
to revisit a prior panel's decision. Krouse, 126 F.3d at 502-03.
60. Barth, supra note 15, at 1326.
61. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON
THE EFFECT OF REPRESENTATIONS MADE IN APPLICATIONS FOR BENEFITS ON THE DETERMINATION
OF WHETHER A PERSON IS A "QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL WITH A DISABILITY" UNDER THE AMERICANS

WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990, intro.
policy/docs/qidreps.html.
62. Id. at pt. III.B.
63. Barth, supra note 15, at 1327-28.
64. Id. at 1327.

(1997),

available at

http://www.eeoc.govl
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Fifth Circuit had affirmed judicial estoppel of an ADA claim. 65 Briefs
filed in the case demonstrate the high stakes perceived by different
actors. An amicus brief submitted on behalf of the plaintiff by over
forty medical, legal, and advocacy organizations argued that "failing to
recognize and disaggregate the distinct policies" of the SSA and ADA
"re-erects barriers for employable individuals with disabilities."66 The
employer, on the other hand, argued that while the ADA was a
"worthy statute designed to eliminate discrimination against the
disabled," it was for Congress, not courts, to decide whether
67
individuals could reap a "double recovery" under the two statutes.
The Supreme Court held that disability benefits do not
automatically bar an ADA claim nor create a rebuttable presumption
of judicial estoppel, finding that "there are too many situations in
which an SSDI claim and an ADA claim can comfortably exist side by
side." 68 The Court emphasized that the SSA does not carefully
consider possible accommodations, nor are SSDI applicants required
to mention accommodations in their applications. 69 Indeed, the Court
observed that it would be infeasible for the Social Security
Administration to consider accommodations, given the millions of
disability applications it processes each year and the "workplacespecific" nature of accommodations. 70 Thus, an SSDI award is simply
not conclusive evidence of an ADA plaintiffs inability to perform a
71
particular job.
The Court provided additional reasons why receipt of SSDI
does not automatically trigger judicial estoppel. Many SSDI awards
are based on "presumptive" disabilities:
impairments
the
Administration categorizes as presumptively resulting in an inability
to work, without an individualized inquiry into whether the applicant
is actually unable to work. 72 Further, the Court recognized that the
recently implemented "trial period" system, under which disabled
persons could continue to receive full SSDI benefits while attempting
to re-enter the work force, demonstrated Congress's recognition that

65. 526 U.S. 795, 800 (1999).
66. Brief of AIDS Policy Center for Children et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
4, Cleveland, 526 U.S. 795 (No. 97-1008).
67. Brief of Respondents at 27-28, Cleveland, 526 U.S. 795 (No. 97-1008) (quoting
McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 619 (3d Cir. 1996)).
68. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 802-03.
69. Id. at 803.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 802-03.
72. Id. at 804.
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disability is a fluid status. 73 Finally, the Court held that there is no
conflict when an ADA plaintiff has applied for-but has not been
awarded-disability benefits. 74 The Court observed that merely
stating claims under both statutes comports with the allowance of
75
alternative and even inconsistent pleadings.
While receipt of SSDI is not fatal to an ADA claim, Cleveland
holds that there are still situations in which the two statutes
genuinely conflict, making judicial estoppel appropriate. 76 Because
ADA plaintiffs must prove that they could perform the essential
functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation, a prior
sworn assertion of one's inability to work may indeed "negate an
essential element" of an ADA case. 77 If so, plaintiffs cannot "simply
ignore the apparent contradiction"; they must provide a "sufficient
explanation" for the inconsistency. 7 Plaintiffs cannot accomplish this
merely by contradicting their SSDI application statements. 79 If the
application pleads something akin to "total disability," the explanation
must be "sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror's concluding that,
assuming the truth of, or the plaintiffs good faith belief in, the earlier
statement," the plaintiff could still perform her essential job functions,
with or without reasonable accommodation.8 0 Some courts, however,
appear to assume the absolute truth of statements in SSDI
applications rather than accept ADA plaintiffs' good faith beliefs at
the time of their applications.8 1

73. Id. at 805.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 805-06.
77. Id. at 806.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 806-07 (observing that the lower courts "have held with virtual unanimity
that a party cannot create a genuine issue of fact sufficient to survive summary judgment simply
by contradicting his or her own previous sworn statement" and adopting a similar rule).
80. Id. at 807 (emphasis added).
81. See, e.g., Lee v. City of Salem, 259 F.3d 667, 677 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that an ADA
plaintiffs "change of heart" or mistaken self-assessment of a medical condition was not sufficient
to resolve the inconsistency of his SSDI and ADA claims); Bisker v. GGS Info. Servs., Inc., No.
1:CV-07-1465, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73310, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2008):
The fact that [the plaintiff] intended to explain her circumstances to an ALJ is not
relevant to the test for estoppel laid out in Cleveland, which only asks whether a
plaintiff has successfully submitted and received SSDI benefits, and if so, can explain
this inconsistency. The fact that she "intended" an explanation of her circumstances
would appear to bear only on the question of bad faith, a consideration in traditional
judicial estoppel analysis, but not part of the analysis under Cleveland.
Jones v. Southcentral Employment Corp., 488 F. Supp. 2d 475, 486 (M.D. Pa. 2007) ("Cleveland
instructs that courts must assume that Plaintiffs representations to the SSA were
truthful ... ").
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Although Cleveland rejected that the ADA and SSA are
categorically incompatible and mandated a particularized inquiry, the
Court drew an opaque distinction between specific factual assertions
in SSDI applications and legal conclusions. The Court noted that a
representation of complete disability in an SSDI claim is often a legal
rather than a factual conclusion.8 2 The Court held that when an SSDI
applicant makes factual statements, such as, "I can/cannot raise my
arm above my head," that contradict an ADA claim, judicial estoppel
remains appropriate.8 3 The EEOC's amicus brief in support of the
plaintiff also highlighted this distinction, arguing that receipt of SSDI
should not pose a per se bar to an ADA claim, but specific factual
inconsistencies between an SSDI application and an ADA claim may
warrant estoppel.8 4 As one commentator observed shortly after
Cleveland, the distinction is problematic because SSDI assertions can
be labeled both legal and factual.8 5 Cleveland's significance, therefore,
may lie more in its general proclamation that the ADA and the SSA
are not mutually exclusive rather than its announcement of a clear
rule.8 6 An employers' bulletin issued shortly after the decision
enthusiastically declared that the fact-law distinction would allow
employers to use SSDI awards to "nip [ADA claims] in the bud."8 7 As
Part III shows, courts rely on the distinction to apply judicial estoppel.

III. JUDICiAL ESTOPPEL BY ANOTHER NAME?
Although Cleveland raised judicial awareness of the differences
between the SSA and the ADA, it has not stopped employers from
winning summary judgment when ADA plaintiffs receive SSDI. This
is not due to a misreading of Cleveland, but rather to the decision's
lack of specificity about what constitutes a successful resolution of the
inconsistency.8 8 Indeed, because ADA claims are context-sensitive, the
Court could not provide a bright-line rule. Yet lower courts seem to

82. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 802.
83. Id.
84. Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 27-28, Cleveland, 526 U.S. 795 (No. 97-1008).
85. Barth, supranote 15, at 1335.
86. Id. at 1336-37.
87. An SSDI Claim of Total Disability Defeats an Employee's ADA Claim, PERSONNEL
MANAGER'S LEGAL LETTER, Sept. 2000, at 1.
88. Barth, supra note 15, at 1347; see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with
DisabilitiesAct as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 947 (2003) ("My point is not that
these lower courts have misread Cleveland. In fact, a fair argument can be made that they are
being entirely faithful to that decision .... These cases simply hold that the plaintiff has failed
to supply a sufficient explanation.").
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have filled this void by focusing on technicalities more than true
inconsistencies. The post-Cleveland parameters that lower courts have
developed may even indicate increased discomfort with the ADA-SSA
intersection. Under these parameters, the seeming mutual exclusivity
of the statutes will continue to frustrate courts unless they focus their
analyses on the specific employer-employee relationship and consider
the employer actions that may have motivated the employee's
assertions to the Social Security Administration.
A. Contradictionor Resolution?
Although "contradiction" and "resolution" are antonyms, lower
courts' post- Cleveland analyses reveal a line that is more blurred than
dichotomous. Cleveland held that an ADA plaintiff cannot avoid
summary judgment "simply by contradicting his or her own previous
sworn statement ...
without explaining the contradiction or
attempting to resolve the disparity."8 9 The Court cited "filing an
affidavit that flatly contradicts that party's sworn deposition" as an
example of an impermissible contradiction.9 0 In Lee v. City of Salem,
the Seventh Circuit fleshed out the meaning of "contradiction" by
holding that the mere disavowal of a prior pleading of total disability
in an SSDI application will not defeat summary judgment. 91 The court
must assume the truth of the statements in the application, and
plaintiffs must resolve the inconsistency by referencing the difference
between the statutes. 92 They may do this by pointing out that the SSA
does not consider the possibility of accommodations, or by showing
93
that their conditions have improved since the SSDI award.
Lee suggests that the mere recitation of the differences between
the statutes satisfies Cleveland. Yet the plaintiff in Lee failed to meet
this liberal standard. He testified that he was actually able to perform
his job when he applied for SSDI; he applied because the fact of his job
termination led him to believe he was disabled. 94 The court found that
the implicit meaning of this explanation was that he lied to the
Administration about being unable to work. 95 Hemade no attempt to
"qualify" his prior statements, such as by arguing that his assertion of
complete disability in his SSDI application meant only that he was
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

526 U.S. at 806.
Id.
259 F.3d 667, 674 (7th Cir. 2001).
Id.
Id. at 675.
Id.
Id. at 676.
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unable to work without a reasonable accommodation. 96 He simply
offered "his own change of heart" to resolve the inconsistency, rather
97
than "any differences in the statutory criteria."
Oddly, after holding that some reference to the statutory
difference is required to resolve the inconsistency, the Lee court
detected this difference within the plaintiffs pleadings despite finding
against him. His SSDI application statement-that his strenuous job
aggravated his back pain-"arguably left room for the notion that Lee
was capable of performing the essential functions of the job" with
some sort of reasonable accommodation. 98 Yet the court declined to
qualify the plaintiffs prior statements for him. Though well aware of
the differences between the statutes, the court placed the burden on
the plaintiff to articulate the distinction, if only through some minimal
reference. 99
In Detz v. Greiner Industries, Inc., the Third Circuit followed
Lee's approach to Cleveland in the context of an Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA") claim, holding that the plaintiff failed to
resolve the inconsistency between his assertion of total disability in
his SSDI application and his subsequent argument under the ADEA
that he nonetheless could perform his job despite his age and physical
condition. 10 0 Detz argued that he became disabled because of his job
termination. 10 1 The court found this explanation "no more than a
further contradiction of his initial assertion. '10 2 Like the Seventh
Circuit in Lee, the Third Circuit observed that had Detz indicated in
his application that he could have performed his prior work with some
accommodation, he might have survived summary judgment.103
Instead, he "manipulated the facts, and perhaps the system, to obtain
SSDI benefits" and then tried to win damages in an age discrimination
104
suit.
A more recent district court case, however, pointed out that,
unlike the ADA, the ADEA's definition of job "qualification" does not
consider reasonable accommodations; it is more stringent in that it
96. Id.
97. Id. at 677.
98. Id. at 676.
99. Id.
100. 346 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 2003).
101. Id. at 120. The plaintiff had been assigned to light-duty work before his termination. He
argued that he could have continued to perform on light-duty but that his termination rendered
him "disabled" under the SSA's definition because, given his physical condition, he would be
unable to obtain another job. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 120-21.
104. Id. at 121.
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requires that the plaintiff was meeting the employer's "legitimate
expectations" at the time of the termination. 10 5 An employee might not
have satisfied the employer's legitimate expectations while suffering
106
from a physical disability, despite any provided accommodations.
Still, like Lee, Detz suggests that courts should not resolve
inconsistencies by articulating the difference between the SSA and
employment discrimination statutes for plaintiffs.
Lee and Detz demonstrate a tension with which courts have
struggled since Cleveland: whether mere reference to the statutory
differences between the SSA and employment discrimination statutes
is an impermissible contradiction or a sufficient resolution. Shortly
after Cleveland, the Third Circuit observed that because it will always
be true that the SSA does not consider reasonable accommodations,
simply pleading this difference always would preclude summary
judgment if doing so amounted to successful resolution. 10 7 Therefore,
plaintiffs must offer additional detail.1 08 In Jones v. Southcentral
Employment Corp., a Pennsylvania district court followed this logic in
judicially estopping an ADA claim. 10 9 The court emphasized that the
plaintiff never actually requested accommodations from her employer;
she did not raise the possibility of accommodations until she brought
her ADA claim.1 10 Speculation on "theoretical" accommodations
amounts only to referencing the statutory differences, which will not
stave off summary judgment. 1 The Jones plaintiff unsuccessfully
relied on a case in which the Third Circuit read the possibility of
accommodations into an ADA plaintiffs SSDI application, despite the
application's silence on accommodations. 1 12 The Jones court observed
that the Third Circuit had supplied this possible resolution for the
plaintiff because she had explicitly requested an accommodation from

105. Montano v. Christmas by Krebs Corp., No. CIV 06-0308, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96219,
at *17 (D.N.M. Aug. 30, 2007).
106. Id. at *18.
107. Motley v. N.J. State Police, 196 F.3d 160, 164-65 (3d Cir. 1999).
108. Id. at 165.
109. No. 1:05-CV-1504, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37579, at *27 (M.D. Pa. May 23, 2007).
110. Id. at *35; see also Bisker v. GGS Info. Servs., Inc., No. 1:CV-07-1465, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 73310, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2008) ('The plaintiff must provide a 'more substantial'
explanation than differing statutory schemes to explain her inconsistencies."); Nodelman v.
Gruner & Jahr USA Publ'g, No. 98 Civ. 1231, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5398, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
26, 2000) (finding that the plaintiff successfully resolved the inconsistency between his ADA
claim and his SSDI award because he requested specific accommodations from his employer and
argued that he could have performed the essential job functions had his employer provided the
accommodations).
111. Jones, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37579, at *36.
112. Turner v. Hershey Chocolate USA, 440 F.3d 604, 610 (3d Cir. 2006).
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her employer, unlike Jones. 1 13 Absent a request, reading possible
accommodations into an SSDI application permits reconciliation by
mere reference to the statutory differences. 1 4
Similarly, pleading that the SSA allows SSDI recipients to
return to work and still draw benefits-a fact that the Cleveland
Court relied on 1 1 5-may not defeat judicial estoppel. In Boxill v.
Brooklyn College, a district court held that a plaintiff who received
SSDI could not avoid summary judgment simply by presenting a
booklet on the Ticket to Work program. 116 The existence of the
program did not explain how the plaintiff was qualified under both the
ADA and the SSA; the "mere fact that [he] may have attempted to
return to work [did] not necessarily support the conclusion that he
[was] able to work."' 17 The court explained that the purpose of Ticket
to Work was to enable disabled individuals to reintegrate gradually
into the workforce, without a sudden loss of benefits. 118 It was not
intended to "perpetuat[e] what amounts to fraud on the SSA" by
allowing plaintiffs to argue that they are able to work under a
discrimination statute but are nonetheless entitled "to collect social
security as some form of unemployment insurance." 119
The concern that SSDI serves as "unemployment insurance"
rather than income for those truly unable to work demonstrates
judicial unease with the rhetoric and reality of Social Security.
Another court echoed this concern when it rejected an ADA plaintiffs
explanation that he "was justified in applying for SSDI benefits, not
because he was disabled, but simply because he needed income."' 20 Yet
protecting the rhetoric of Social Security while overlooking the reality
reinforces a dichotomized view of the SSA's and ADA's protected
classes. Professor Samuel Bagenstos argues that courts' seeming
frustration with ADA employment discrimination suits stems not from
judges "impos[ing] their own retrograde views of the proper response
to disability," but from the notion that the very purpose of the ADA is
to reduce dependence on direct aid from the government. 12 1 Courts
therefore try to restrict the statute's protection to those who truly
113. Jones, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37579, at *37.
114. Id. at *37-38.
115. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 805 (1999).
116. No. CV-96-561, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11762, at *19 (E.D.N.Y. July 10, 2003).
117. Id. at *21 (emphasis added).
118. Id. at *21-22.
119. Id. at *22.
120. Devine v. Transp. Int'l Pool, Inc., No. 06-986, 2007 WL 3033776, at *6 n.3 (W.D. Pa. Oct.
16, 2007).
121. Bagenstos, supra note 88, at 924, 927.
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need accommodations. 122 Matthew Diller argues that this mistakenly
123
treats SSDI- and ADA-protected populations as mutually exclusive.
When plaintiffs attempt to claim protection under both statutes,
courts tend to "treat the disabled individual as duplicitous and...
'double-dipping.' "124 According to Diller, courts misunderstand the
administrative reality of SSDI determinations. Although objective and
medical in theory, SSDI determinations in reality depend on
subjective assumptions about social and economic barriers to
employment. 125 Therefore, SSDI awards are findings of excuse from
work, not impossibility. 126
Diller's excuse argument suggests that judicial estoppel never
should apply. If SSDI awards reflect excuse rather than impossibility,
not only should mere reference to the statutory differences satisfy
Cleveland, but the intersection of the statutes never should furnish a
defense for employers. If SSDI signals that some individuals face a
combination of medical and socioeconomic barriers that make gainful
employment unlikely, it is not contradictory to argue that one could
have performed the essential job functions if only an employer had
removed some of the medical barriers. 27 Pointing out that the Social
Security Administration does not consider accommodations merely
would highlight the agency's awareness that its determinations are
contingent. It need not inquire about accommodations if it is not
conclusively determining the impossibility of employment. A
successful ADA suit even would vindicate the excuse concept of SSDI
by punishing employers who erect employment barriers.
While Diller's excuse argument may be a more realistic
conception of SSDI awards, courts understandably hesitate to issue
rulings based on the notion that a statute does not mean what it says.
The SSA speaks of inability, not excuse.1 28 Still, Cleveland recognizes
a permissible gap between the language and realities of the statute.
The problem is whether ADA plaintiffs can convince courts that their
situations fit within this gap. Pointing to the statutory differences
may amount only to showing that the gap exists, which is not enough.
Yet requiring plaintiffs to resolve the difference from within an SSDI
application recreates the fiction that SSDI benefits and ADA claims
are mutually exclusive. For example, the Detz court found that the
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 927.
Diller, supra note 15, at 1035.
Id.
Id. at 1062-63.
Id. at 1065.
Id. at 1066.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (2006).
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plaintiffs SSDI award could not be reconciled with his ADEA claim
129
because his SSDI application did not mention accommodations.
Despite Cleveland's caution that SSDI applications do not require
applicants to mention accommodations, 130 Detz suggests that failing to
do so forfeits a subsequent employment discrimination claim. Other
courts have recognized that looking for resolution solely within an
SSDI application evades Cleveland's conclusion that SSDI application
statements are not the final word on the bounds of a disability. As the
Seventh Circuit stated in Lee: "Explanations of the sort Cleveland
requires are, in short, contextual-they resolve the seeming
discrepancy... not by contradicting what the plaintiff told the Social
Security Administration,
but by demonstrating that those
representations... leave room for the possibility" that the plaintiff
was nonetheless able to perform the job at issue with the requisite

accommodations.

131

Looking for resolution primarily within SSDI applications may
permit courts to cast virtually any attempt at resolution as an
impermissible contradiction. Because SSDI applications include
boilerplate language on inability to work, 132 arguing that one could
have performed the essential functions of a job if given a reasonable
accommodation almost always will contradict an SSDI application.
For this reason, courts should look for resolution within the specific
employer-employee relationship. When confronted with the possibility
of judicial estoppel, ADA plaintiffs should assert a specific
accommodation that would have enabled job performance. Although
some courts may dismiss a later-proposed accommodation as
speculative and concocted at the summary judgment stage, others may

129. 346 F.3d 109, 120-21 (3d Cir. 2003).
130. 526 U.S. 795, 803 (1999) ("[W]hen the SSA determines whether an individual is
disabled for SSDI purposes, it does not take the possibility of 'reasonable accommodation' into
account, nor need an applicant refer to the possibility of reasonable accommodation when she
applies for SSDI.").
131. 259 F.3d 667, 675 (7th Cir. 2001).
132. SSDI applications can now be filed online. An applicant is asked, "During the last 14
months, have you been unable to work because of illnesses, injuries or conditions that have
lasted or are expected to last at least 12 months or can be expected to result in death?" Social
Security Online, Apply for Disability Benefits Home Page, http://www.socialsecurity.
gov/applyfordisability (last visited May 22, 2009). When filling out the online application, the
applicant is asked whether "there was some period in the past 14 months where you could not
work because of a serious illness, injury or condition." Id. (click on the "Adult" application link;
click on "online application for Social Security Benefits" under Step 2; check the appropriate
selections on the right hand side to indicate for whom you are applying for benefits and that you
have read the Privacy Act statement; the question appears on the following "Applicant
Identification" page) (last visited May 22, 2009).
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find that it at least goes beyond pleading the bare statutory difference
133
between the SSA and the ADA.
B. Legal Versus FactualAssertions
Cleveland distinguished between statements of "total
disability" to the Social Security Administration-which the Court
deemed "context-related legal conclusion[s]"-and "purely factual"
statements. 34 In her SSDI application, Carolyn Cleveland made
general statements that she was "unable to work due to [her]
disability" 1 and
"could no longer do the job" because of her
"condition." 35 The Court held that these blanket assertions evinced
Cleveland's legal conclusion that she was disabled; they were not
contradictory factual statements sufficient to preclude an ADA
claim.13 6 When statements to the SSA factually contradict a prima
facie ADA claim, Cleveland holds that judicial estoppel may be
warranted. 137
Lower courts have honed in on this legal-factual distinction. In
McClaren v. Morrison Management Specialists, Inc., an age
discrimination suit, the Fifth Circuit affirmed judicial estoppel against
a plaintiff who received SSDI after his termination. 138 McClaren's
SSDI application stated that he "constant[ly]" experienced "pain lower
back, chest pain, fatigue... neropathy [sic], both legs feet, dizziness,
sleeplessness, diabetes, hycholesterol [sic]. '"139 He also stated that his
employer had provided accommodations and that he had stopped
working based on his physician's advice.1 40 The court underscored that
133. See, e.g., D'Ambrosia v. Pa. Chamber of Bus. & Indus., No. 1:06-CV-2182, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 77147, at *11 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2008) (holding that judicial estoppel was not
warranted because the plaintiff explained that he was "never specifically asked by the Social
Security Administration ('SSA') whether he could do his prior job with an accommodation; he
affirmatively states that he believes himself able to work, provided an accommodation is made
for a 'modified work schedule and modified training schedule' ").
134. 526 U.S. 795, 802 (1999).
135. Id. at 799.
136. Id. at 802.
137. Id.; see also Feldman v. Am. Mem'l Life Ins. Co., 196 F.3d 783, 791 (7th Cir. 1999):
In her SSDI application, [Plaintiff] convinced the SSA of her disability with
unambiguous statements about her total incapacity to perform any substantial gainful
employment. [Plaintiff] now explains flatly that she "was able to perform the essential
functions of her job, with or without reasonable accommodations and, thus, was a
'qualified individual.' " This bald statement, without more, crashes face first against
her claim of total disability in her SSDI application.
(emphasis added).
138. 420 F.3d 457, 458 (5th Cir. 2005).
139. Id. at 464.
140. Id. at 460.

1266

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:4:1245

these statements were specific and factual, not general legal
14 1
assertions that McClaren met the SSA definition of "disabled."
In an unsuccessful attempt to resolve the inconsistency,
McClaren argued that his employer's failure to select him for a certain
position led him to choose incapacitating surgery over employment; he
would have chosen a different course of treatment had he been
hired. 142 The specificity of his SSDI application statements rendered
this explanation insufficient; the factual descriptions precluded the
possibility that he could have performed the job. 143 The explanation
amounted to mere "disavowal" of his application, not resolution. 144 As
McClaren indicates, the more specific the statements in an SSDI
application, the greater the likelihood that an explanation proffered in
ADA litigation will be characterized as contradiction rather than
resolution.
Similarly, in Lorde v. City of Philadelphia, a district court
relied on the legal-factual distinction to judicially estop an ADA
plaintiff who argued she could perform the essential functions of her
stenographer position,
despite telling the
Social
Security
Administration that she could do "no typing, no keyboarding of any
type, [and] no repetitive finger movement."'14 5 This specific factual
assertion estopped her from arguing that she could have performed
the essential job functions if only her employer had accommodated her
by limiting her typing to two hours per day.' 46 As this Note's solution
argues, the factual specificity of Lorde's statements matters only if she
actually requested an accommodation for her typing difficulties. If her
employer denied the accommodation of limited typing, it is not
inconsistent to assert in her SSDI application that she could not type.
Despite Cleveland's distinction, specific factual statements do
not inevitably lead to judicial estoppel. For example, in Smith v.
Midland Brake, Inc., a plaintiff who developed dermatitis after years
of contact with chemicals at his job successfully resolved the factual
14 7
inconsistency between his SSDI application and ADA claim.
Although the plaintiff represented to the Administration that his
"hands and fingers were unusable most of the time" and that he could
have "no contact with irritants," he persuaded the district court that
he nonetheless could perform his job, which required contact with
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 465.
Id. at 464.
Id. at 466.
Id. at 465.
No. 98-5267, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17196, at *7-8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2000).
Id. at *8-9.
98 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1240-42 (D. Kan. 2000).

2009] WHAT EMPLOYEES SAY, OR WHAT EMPLOYERS DO 1267
irritants. 148 His successful resolution came from the larger Social
Security record, which included statements from physicians that these
restrictions could have been accommodated with other kinds of
work. 149 Consistent with Diller's excuse theory, and yet in contrast to
the SSA's definition of "disabled," the court reasoned that the
Administration concluded only that the plaintiff was unable to
perform specific tasks, not that he was unable to perform any work

whatsoever. 150
While it is certainly easier to detect inconsistencies when
statements are specific and factual, the legal-factual distinction
creates inequities among SSDI recipients who prevailed for different
reasons. As Cleveland recognized, many applicants receive SSDI based
151
on the Administration's list of presumptively disabling conditions.
These applicants are more likely to receive SSDI through general
assertions and therefore stand a better chance of resolving the
seeming conflict with the ADA. Applicants without presumptively
disabling conditions must make more specific assertions. Although
their statements may lack any indication of possible accommodations,
this does not preclude the possibility that accommodations were
available.
Most importantly, the factual-legal distinction overlooks the
administrative reality of SSDI proceedings and is unfair to ADA
plaintiffs who applied for SSDI under the mistaken belief that their
disabilities could not be accommodated. The boilerplate language of
SSDI applications and the standardized nature of the intake process
may convert almost any statements into "legal conclusions." This
Note's solution posits that more specific statements create an
irreconcilable inconsistency only when they indicate affirmatively that
not even the accommodation at issue in the ADA litigation would have
enabled job performance.
C. Timing of the Statements
The date that SSDI applicants list as the onset date of their
disabilities (the date they became unable to work) plays a role in the
Cleveland analysis. A plaintiff may have been "qualified" to perform
her job at time of an adverse employment action despite experiencing

148. Id.

149. Id. at 1240-41.
150. Id.
151. 526 U.S. 795, 804 (1999).
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health deterioration afterwards. 15 2 The ADA seems to require that
plaintiffs be able to perform the essential job functions at the time of
the adverse employment action (such as a termination or failure to
hire). 153 A determination by the Social Security Administration that
disability commenced before the adverse employment action therefore
creates an inconsistency. 154 Courts sometimes find inconsistency even
when the disability-onset date is the same date as the adverse
employment action.1 55 In McClaren, the plaintiff lost his job on June 8,
2000.156 He subsequently listed June 8 in his SSDI application as the
date on which he became unable to work. 15 7 The court held that he
was therefore precluded from arguing that he was a "qualified
individual" on the date of his termination.1 58 Similarly, a district court
applied judicial estoppel to an ADA plaintiff with Hepatitis C who
listed the date of his termination in his SSDI application, despite his
pleading that he applied one year after his termination and only listed
his termination date because he "was not sure how to determine on
what date [he] became unable to work," and "[i]t seemed like a fair
159
date to pick because it was the last day that [he] had worked."
Rather than deeming this explanation a satisfactory one for choosing
an inevitably arbitrary pinpoint date for the onset of a workpreventing disability, the court interpreted the plaintiffs argument as
a specious "after-the-fact explanation" that might make sense with a
"sudden physical injury," but not with a "gradually deteriorating
disease" like Hepatitis C, which the plaintiff knew he had at the time
160
of his termination.

152. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2006); see also Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 805 ("[Tjhe nature of an
individual's disability may change over time, so that a statement about that disability at the
time of an individual's application for SSDI benefits may not reflect an individual's capacities at
the time of the relevant employment decision.").
153. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (defining a "qualified individual" as "an individual [who], with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires").
154. See, e.g., Lee v. City of Salem, 259 F.3d 667, 668-70 (7th Cir. 2001) (estopping a plaintiff
whom the SSA deemed disabled six months prior to his termination); Walter v. United Tel. Co. of
Pa., No. 3:2004-255, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80923, at *21-22, *37 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2006)
(estopping a plaintiff whom the SSA found disabled as of the date of his injury, which occurred
five days prior to his termination).
155. E.g., Johnson v. ExxonMobil Corp., 426 F.3d 887, 892 (7th Cir. 2005); Devine v. Bd. of
Comm'rs, 49 F. App'x 57, 61-62 (7th Cir. 2002); Marino v. Adamar of Jersey, Inc., No. 05-4528,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7893, at *24 (D.N.J. Feb. 4, 2009).
156. 420 F.3d 457, 460 (5th Cir. 2005).
157. Id. at 460 n.2.
158. Id. at 465 n.9.
159. Marino, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7893, at *15-16.
160. Id. at *16, *20.
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Other cases take a more practical approach to timing. In Felix
v. New York City Transit Authority, a district court declined to
judicially estop a plaintiff who told the Administration that she
became unable to work even before her job termination. 16 1 The court
emphasized that although she listed a pre-termination disability date
in her SSDI application, she did not actually apply until months after
her termination. 162 Her disability may have progressed and rendered
her totally unable to work by that point. 163 In Turner v. Hershey
Chocolate USA, the Third Circuit resolved the date discrepancy in a
different way when an ADA plaintiff told the Social Security
Administration that she became disabled two years before her
termination. 64 The court held that the disability-onset date must "be
read as lacking the qualifier of reasonable accommodation."'' 65 In other
words, the court read the application to say: "I am unable to work [as
' 66
of this date] without reasonable accommodation."'
As with the other parameters courts have developed to
evaluate the ADA-SSA intersection, the timing analysis risks
obscuring the administrative context of SSDI applications. SSDI
applicants frequently list their last date of employment as the date on
which their disabilities commenced. 67 This makes sense given that
the onset date asks applicants when they became unable to work;
many applicants presumably frame this question in terms of an
adverse employment action rather than an "official" disability onset
date. When courts narrowly limit ADA qualification to the precise date
of adverse employment action, they emphasize technicalities and do
injustice to litigants who may have applied for SSDI on the mistaken
assumption that their conditions could not be accommodated in the
workplace. This frustrates the purpose of the ADA. A better approach
is to recognize that SSDI applicants often interpret the disabilityonset date in applications as simply asking for the last date on which
they worked.
161. 154 F. Supp. 2d 640, 649, 652 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
162. Id. at 652.
163. Id.
164. 440 F.3d 604, 607 (3d Cir. 2006).
165. Id. at 610.
166. Id. (emphasis added).
167. E.g., id. at 607, 610; Johnson v. ExxonMobil Corp., 426 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 2005);
Devine v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 49 F. App'x 57, 61 (7th Cir. 2002); Lee v. City of Salem, 259 F.3d 667,
670 (7th Cir. 2001); Marino v. Adamar of Jersey, Inc., No. 05-4528, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7893,
at *4,*17 (D.N.J. Feb. 4, 2009); Quick v. Albert Einstein Healthcare, No. 05-4940, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 78335, at *8-9 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2007); Mendez v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp., No. 04-CV01095, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18988, at *9-10 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 2, 2005); Smith v. Dovenmuehle
Mortgage, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 1138, 1139-40 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
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D. Extending Cleveland to PrivateDisability Benefits
Finally, the hesitancy to apply judicial estoppel to private
disability benefits-administered by insurance companies rather than
the government-suggests that something about the receipt of public
disability benefits by ADA plaintiffs is particularly troubling. Cases
addressing the issue tend to treat ADA plaintiffs who received private
benefits more favorably than those awarded SSDI. 168 Some courts hold
that judicial estoppel simply does not apply to unsworn statements in
long-term disability ("LTD") benefit applications, unlike sworn SSDI
applications. 169 Courts that do apply Cleveland tend to focus more on
the particular employment relationship. They observe that employer
encouragement may have played a role in the decision to apply,
particularly because private disability benefits are usually provided by
the employer. If an employer concludes that an employee is unable to
do a job or denies an accommodation, this may induce the employee to
apply for private disability benefits. 170 When there is some indication
of employer inducement, courts may hesitate to preclude ADA claims.
In one case applying Cleveland to private benefits, the Seventh Circuit
even supplied this inducement explanation for the plaintiff, rather
than requiring him to proffer his own explanation. 171 The court's
willingness to provide a resolution in the context of private, but not
public,1 72 disability benefits perhaps suggests that plaintiffs receiving
public benefits must proffer a stronger explanation.
Even absent an indication of employer inducement, courts may
be more forgiving of inconsistencies in LTD applications. One
explanation may be the variability of LTD applications, in contrast to
168. E.g., Giles v. Gen. Elec. Co., 11 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 1242, 1248 (5th Cir. 2001);
Pals v. Schepel Buick & GMC Truck, Inc., 220 F.3d 495, 498-99 (7th Cir. 2000); Millage v. City of
Sioux City, 258 F. Supp. 2d 976, 995 (N.D. Iowa 2003); Mulhern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 191 F.
Supp. 2d 326, 342 (W.D.N.Y. 2002); Fliss v. Movado Group, Inc., No. 98 C 3383, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11745, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 14, 2000); Nodelman v. Gruner & Jahr USA Publ'g, No. 98
Civ. 1231, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5398, at *24-26 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2000).
169. Mendoza v. Micro Elecs., Inc., No. 02 C 8005, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5561, at *22 n.ll
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 2005); Fliss, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11745, at *16; see also Giles, 11 Am.
Disabilities Cas. (BNA) at 1247-48 (declining to decide the issue of whether inconsistencies
between unsworn statements and ADA claims warrant summary judgment).
170. See, e.g., Pals, 220 F.3d at 498 ("One possible explanation might have been that
[Plaintiff applied for LTD] two days after meeting with [his employer] and learning that he
would not be welcomed back."); Millage, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 995 (holding that an ADA plaintiffs
explanation that his employer excluded him from a position, rendering him eligible for LTD
benefits, was sufficient to avoid summary judgment); Mulhern, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 342
(emphasizing that the plaintiff applied for LTD benefits only because his employer would not
allow him to maintain his position).
171. Pals, 220 F.3d at 498.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99.
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the uniformity of SSDI applications. For example, a district court did
not judicially estop a plaintiff who answered "no" on an LTD
application in response to whether he could perform the work with a
"job modification." 173 "Job modification" was not necessarily equivalent
to a "reasonable accommodation" under the ADA. 174 Another court
accepted a plaintiffs bare explanation that an LTD application does
not consider reasonable accommodations. 1 75 This acceptance contrasts
with the general rule that mere reference to the accommodation
difference between the SSA and ADA does not satisfy Cleveland. 76 In
sum, courts are more likely to find permissible ambiguities within
private benefit applications and appear more willing to focus on the
particular employment relationship. This Note's solution advocates
that courts maintain this focus in assessing SSDI statements.
By being more willing to countenance facial inconsistencies in
the context of private disability benefits, courts may unwittingly
communicate annoyance with ADA plaintiffs who turn to public funds
for income support. This frustration may support Bagenstos's
argument that judicial estoppel's currency in the ADA-SSA context is
grounded in the belief that the ADA should reduce dependency on
SSDI.177 Yet studies show that, despite the passage of the ADA, the
SSDI rolls grew dramatically in the 1990s.17 8 Some commentators
argue that the ADA actually exacerbated unemployment because its
reasonable accommodation requirement increased the expense of
hiring persons with disabilities. 79 Although discouraging reliance on
SSDI may be a way to preserve taxpayer dollars, this motivation must
be tempered by the recognition that SSDI is not the final word on a
person's abilities in the workplace. Overemphasizing the finality of
statements in SSDI applications frustrates both the SSA and ADA.

173. Nodelman, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5398, at *25-26.
174. Id. at *26.
175. Abate v. Cendant Mobility Servs. Corp., No. 3-03-cv-1858, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50623,
at *18-20 (D. Conn. July 13, 2007).
176. See supratext accompanying notes 90-114.
177. Bagenstos, supranote 88, at 927.
178. Nanette Goodman & Timothy Waidmann, Social Security Disability Insurance and the
Recent Decline in the Employment Rate of People with Disabilities, in THE DECLINE IN
EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES: A POLICY PUZZLE 339, 339 (David C. Stapleton &

Richard V. Burkhauser eds., 2003) [hereinafter A POLICY PUZZLE]. The SSDI rolls increased by
sixty-seven percent from 1990 to 2000. Id.
179. Thomas DeLeire, The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Employment of People
with Disabilities,in A POLICY PUZZLE, supranote 178, at 259, 273.
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IV. FOCUSING ON THE PARTICULAR EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP

Despite Cleveland's instruction that courts give plaintiffs the
opportunity to resolve any discrepancy between their SSA and ADA
claims, courts often continue to assume that facial inconsistencies
under these different statutes, and the different adjudicative contexts
that accompany them, are bad-faith attempts at double recovery. 80
While this conclusion flows naturally from judicial estoppel's purpose
of preserving legal integrity, it obscures the ADA's focus on specific
employer-employee relationships. The ADA protects not only against
discrimination based on actual medical conditions, but also against
employers' mistaken beliefs about the health of their employees under
the "regarded as" definition of disabled. 81 For this reason, courts
should confine their Cleveland analyses to the specific employeremployee relationship at issue and consider the events and beliefs
that informed plaintiffs' SSDI application statements. The relevant
questions are whether ADA plaintiffs notified their employers of the
need for an accommodation and whether employers denied the
accommodation and treated these plaintiffs as unable to work.
Further, courts should give special consideration to the standardized
nature of an SSDI claim. This solution would mitigate discomfort with
the surface inconsistencies of the SSA and ADA by acknowledging
that the differences between SSDI and ADA adjudications do not
present the risk of testimonial offense that judicial estoppel aims to
avoid.
Cleveland rested on the key difference between the ADA and
SSA: the SSA does not consider whether a claimant could have
performed a particular job with reasonable accommodations 182
Indeed, as Cleveland noted, SSDI applicants are not required to
mention possible accommodations in their applications.18 3 Therefore,
the dual inquiry of whether there is an inconsistency between an SSDI
application and an ADA claim and whether the plaintiff offers a
sufficient resolution should focus on whether the employer had actual
or constructive knowledge
that the plaintiff needed an
180. E.g., Lee v. City of Salem, 259 F.3d 667, 676 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he unavoidable
implication of [Plaintiffs] testimony is that what he told the Social Security Administration...
was untrue."); Motley v. N.J. State Police, 196 F.3d 160, 166 (3d Cir. 1999) ("It is difficult to get
around the conclusion that, in at least one of the fora, [Plaintiff] was not completely honest.");
Musarra v. Vineyards Dev. Corp., 343 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1122 (M.D. Fla. 2004) ("It is clear that
plaintiff is attempting to perpetrate a sham.").
181. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3) (2006).
182. 526 U.S. 795, 803 (1999).
183. Id.

2009] WHAT EMPLOYEES SAY, OR WHAT EMPLOYERS DO

1273

accommodation. The ADA takes a relationship-specific approach to
accommodations by requiring employers and employees to engage in
an "interactive process" regarding possible job modifications.18 4 As the
Cleveland Court
recognized,
"the
matter
of
'reasonable
accommodation' may turn on highly disputed workplace-specific
matters." 18 5 Interpretive guidance on the ADA affirms the contextsensitive
nature of accommodation:
"No specific form of
accommodation is guaranteed for all individuals with a particular
disability. Rather, an accommodation must be tailored to match the
needs of the disabled individual with the needs of the job's essential
functions." 186 Because the ADA holds employers liable for failing to
18 7
accommodate "known physical or mental limitations" of employees,
the initial burden is usually on the employee to request an
accommodation. 188
The key issues in ADA litigation, regardless of the presence of
SSDI benefits, should be whether the plaintiff requested an
accommodation and the employer's reaction to this request. If the
employee never triggered the interactive process, an ADA claim may
fail even without judicial estoppel. If the employee did request an
accommodation, courts should examine the SSDI application
statements and consider estoppel only if the statements affirmatively
and specifically indicate that not even the requested accommodation
would have permitted performance of the essential job functions. This
solution preserves the employer's defense under the ADA that the
189
requested accommodation would pose an undue hardship.
Cleveland indicates that the relevant place to look for whether
an employee can perform the job with reasonable accommodations is
within the employment relationship, not an SSDI application.1 90 Yet
by estopping plaintiffs whose applications do not mention

184. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2008).
185. 526 U.S. at 803.
186. 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app.
187. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006) (emphasis added).
188. See Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 261 (1st Cir. 2001) ("Because an
employee's disability and concomitant need for accommodation are often not known to the
employer until the employee requests an accommodation, the ADA's reasonable accommodation
requirement usually does not apply unless 'triggered by a request' from the employee.").
189. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(B); see also Payne v. Fairfax County, No. 1:05cv1446, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 79725, at *21, *28-29 (E.D. Va. Nov. 1, 2006) (finding that although the plaintiffs
receipt of SSDI did not bar his ADA claim, his requested accommodation of intermittent,
unplanned absences was unreasonable). The Payne court noted that under Fourth Circuit
precedent, mere reference to the statutory difference between the SSA and ADA was a sufficient
resolution under Cleveland. 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79725, at *20.
190. 526 U.S. at 803.
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accommodations, courts punish them for omitting something that the
SSA does not require. For example, in Mitchell v. Washingtonville
Central School District, the Second Circuit affirmed summary
judgment against an ADA plaintiff who applied for SSDI shortly
before his termination from his custodial job. 191 The plaintiff, who had
a prosthetic leg, told the Social Security Administration that the
amputation prevented him from working because he could not stand
for long periods. 192 The court held that this specific factual assertion
precluded him from arguing he could perform the essential job
functions of a custodian, which require long periods of standing. 193 The
plaintiff responded that one month before his termination, he obtained
a new prosthesis that allowed him to stand longer. 194 He also
contended that the school could have accommodated his disability by
giving him more sedentary work. 95 The court rejected these
arguments, finding that his SSDI assertion that he was unable to
stand for long periods contradicted his ADA claim that he nonetheless
96
could stand for a significant part of the day.
Mitchell misses the point of Cleveland by suggesting that -the
SSDI application is the proper forum in which to raise the prospect of
accommodations. The key question is whether Mitchell requested
accommodations from his employer. If he did and was denied, he
understandably may have believed that he could not succeed in the
workplace. Viewed in this light, his SSDI assertion that his disability
prevented him from standing is reasonable: he may have believed he
had no option but to stand all day. His employer would still have a
range of defenses under the ADA itself, including that Mitchell never
requested an accommodation, that sedentary work would not have
enabled him to perform the essential functions of the position, or that
the accommodation was unreasonable. 197 Indeed, the court held that
Mitchell's SSDI application only estopped him from arguing that he
could stand for long periods; he was free to argue that he could sit.198
Because extended standing was an essential job function, however, his
SSDI application defeated the ADA claim. 199 Interestingly, the same
result could have been reached without judicial estoppel. Aside from
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

190 F.3d 1, 3-4 (2d Cir. 1999).
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 7.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)-(9) (2006).
Mitchell, 190 F.3d at 8.

199. Id.
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providing additional and quick grounds for affirmance, estoppel may
have appealed to the court as a means of communicating frustration
with the statutes. Yet statutory conflict is not a novelty in litigation,
which begs the question of judicial estoppel's traction when plaintiffs
seek redress for disability discrimination.
Under this Note's solution, Mitchell's SSDI application would
truly conflict with his ADA claim only if it affirmatively indicated that
not even his requested accommodation would have enabled him to do
the job. If he told the Administration that he could not stand or sit for
long periods, this would contradict his later claim that sedentary work
would have been a reasonable accommodation. In fact, the plaintiff
told the Administration that he could no longer work because he did
not think he could find a sedentary job. 20 0 That the Administration
agreed with his assessment supports Diller's argument that SSDI
awards reflect excuse from work, not impossibility. Mitchell likely
applied for SSDI due to a failed relationship with a particular
employer. His beliefs and those of his employer inform not only
whether such a failed relationship violates the ADA, but also whether
his SSDI assertions present the sort of egregious contradiction that
judicial estoppel punishes.
A more recent ADA case underscores the relevance of denied
accommodations to SSDI application statements. In Bisker v. GGS
Information Services, Inc., a Pennsylvania district court judicially
estopped a woman with multiple sclerosis who lost her job after
20 1
having to take medical leave during a deterioration in her condition.
She made an accommodation request to her employer that she be
permitted to work from home, a modification that her physician
supported but that her employer denied because being present at the
20 2
worksite was an essential function of her job as a parts lister.
Unemployed and in need of income, the plaintiff applied for SSDI a
few months after her termination. She specifically mentioned in her
application that her employer had denied her accommodation
request. 20 3 Although the Administration denied her initial application,
she was awarded SSDI after she appealed, although her appeal did

200. Id. at 4.
201. No. 1:CV-07-1465, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73310, at *1-2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2008).
202. Id. at *3.
203. Id. at *4; see also Carstetter v. Adams County Transit Auth., No. 1:06-CV-1993, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51874, at *16 (M.D. Pa. July 8, 2008) (finding that an ADA plaintiff
successfully reconciled his ADA claim with his receipt of SSDI benefits because in his SSDI
application he provided a "lengthy description of his physical abilities," which could lead a jury to
conclude that he was found disabled because he was "unable to perform strenuous job functions
without accommodation in the form of occasional rest periods").

1276

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:4:1245

not go to a hearing. 20 4 In an attempt to reconcile the Administration's
finding that she could not work with her subsequent ADA claim, she
argued that had her SSDI claim gone to a hearing, she would have
told the administrative law judge ("AL") more about her
circumstances. 20 5 The court rejected this explanation, emphasizing
that a Cleveland analysis hinges on the ultimate success of an SSDI
claim, not the possibility of explanations at an administrative hearing
20 6
or on whether SSDI application statements were made in bad faith.
It is not difficult to imagine the sort of individualized
circumstances Bisker may have communicated to an ALJ had her
SSDI appeal gone to a hearing. She may have mentioned that her
employer denied her request to work from home, which led her to
believe that she could not be accommodated in the workplace, and
therefore her best course of action was to apply for government
support. Additionally, she may have argued that her multiple
sclerosis, a degenerative disease, had worsened by the time of her
SSDI application a few months after her job termination.
Unfortunately, she did not offer these explanations to the court.
Perhaps she would have avoided summary judgment had she been
more specific in her pleadings regarding the "circumstances" she
would have communicated to an ALJ. Still, it would not have been a
stretch for the court to draw these inferences in favor of Bisker at the
summary judgment stage.
Bisker is a perfect example of why judicial estoppel is rarely an
appropriate way to dispose of ADA claims and why it often does
injustice to the context-sensitive inquiry that both the ADA and
Cleveland require. The court may have found it telling that Bisker
mentioned her employer's denial of her requested accommodations in
her SSDI application, even though SSDI applicants are not required to
list possible accommodations. Because receipt of SSDI turns on an
ostensible finding of "complete" inability to work, mentioning possible
accommodations is not in an applicant's best interest. That Bisker
discussed the possibility of working from home in her application, and
that the Social Security Administration still found her disabled, may
have carried significant weight with the district court in finding that
she was not qualified to perform her essential job functions under the
ADA. Under this proposed solution, if Bisker had stated in her SSDI
application that not even an accommodation of telecommuting would

204. Bisker, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73310, at *4.
205. Id. at *8.
206. Id.
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permit her to work, she might have created a true inconsistency with
an ADA claim under Cleveland.
However, the denial of Bisker's request is of paramount
importance; Bisker likely believed that she could not succeed in the
workplace because she was unlikely to find an employer who would
accommodate her multiple sclerosis by allowing her to work from
home. Faced with the prospect of indeterminate unemployment and
mounting bills, Bisker understandably applied for income support. It
may be true that her condition had progressed to a point that she
would be unable to obtain the requisite accommodations at any job
that fit her experience and skill level and therefore was not a
"qualified individual" under the ADA. Judicial estoppel is not
necessary to reach this conclusion. The ADA itself offers a defense for
employers: that the employee's proposed accommodation was
unreasonable by imposing an undue burden or thwarting the
performance of essential job functions. 2 7 By taking the "shortcut" of
judicial estoppel, courts avoid the undesirable prospect of
retrospectively dictating to employers how to restructure their
business practices, 20 but at a cost of enshrining employees' perhaps
mistaken beliefs about their rights under the ADA and ignoring the
possible unlawfulness of employers' actions.
The necessity of carefully examining the employment
relationship at issue is echoed by Turner v. Hershey Chocolate USA, in
which the Third Circuit read an ADA plaintiffs SSDI application as
lacking the qualifier of reasonable accommodations. 20 9 Her statements
to the Social Security Administration passed muster when read as "I

207. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A) (2006) ("The term 'undue hardship' means an action requiring
significant difficulty or expense .... "). Factors to be considered include the nature and cost of the
employee's proposed accommodation, the financial resources of the facility, the number of
persons employed at the facility, and the impact of the proposed accommodation on the facility's
resources and operations. Id. § 12111(10)(B).
208. See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978) ("Courts are
generally less competent than employers to restructure business practices, and unless mandated
to do so by Congress they should not attempt it."); see also Pamela S. Karlan & George
Rutherglen, Disabilities,Discrimination,and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 21
(1996):
The ADA ...

demands a distinctive sort of judicial evaluation ....

[It] calls for a far

more individualized process of fitting individuals to jobs than the antidiscrimination
and affirmative action principles of Title VII. While it is certainly possible that this
case-by-case approach to enforcement could deteriorate into purely ad hoc judicial
decisionmaking, precedent counteracts this tendency .... Accommodations imposed,
or approved, in prior cases simplify the process of later negotiations over
accommodations for other employers and employees. With the accumulation of
decisions, the adequacy of any particular accommodation will become better known to
the parties and more easily evaluated by a court.
209. 440 F.3d 604, 610 (3d Cir. 2006).
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am unable to work without reasonable accommodation." 210 By reading
in this lacking qualifier, the Third Circuit underscored the
relationship-specific inquiry that a careful application of Cleveland
requires. Turner had requested an accommodation that she be exempt
from a rotation schedule in the Hershey plant; her SSDI application
did not mention this request. 211 Under this solution, if her application
affirmatively indicated that not even a rotation exemption would
permit her to work, this would present an inconsistency under the
first prong of the Cleveland analysis.
Even if an SSDI application statement meets this narrow
definition of an inconsistency, an ADA claim may survive if the
employer denied the requested accommodation, as in Bisker. If an
employer concludes that the requested accommodation would not
enable the employee to perform the essential job functions, the
employee may internalize the denial as an inability to work for the
purposes of SSDI. Denials of accommodations, lawful or unlawful, may
often explain ADA plaintiffs' good faith belief in the truth of their
statements to the Social Security Administration-a belief Cleveland
permits lower courts to consider. 21 2 Whether the employer lawfully
denied the accommodation as unreasonable is a separate issue that
arises under the ADA, not the SSA.
By focusing on the particular employment relationship more
than the SSDI application, this solution narrows the relevance and
lessens the unfairness of the resolution-contradiction and factual-legal
distinctions that post-Cleveland cases have developed. These tenuous
distinctions create inequities among SSDI applicants who may have
believed that they could not succeed in the workplace because of their
employers' actions. 21 3 Overemphasizing these distinctions diverts
focus from the employer's beliefs and actions. Under this solution, the
factual specificity of SSDI statements matters only if it indicates that
not even the accommodation at issue in the ADA litigation would have
enabled job performance.
Some courts have acknowledged that an SSDI application may
be motivated by an employer's failure to provide accommodations, or
by an employee's lack of knowledge that accommodations may be
available. In Turner, the Third Circuit emphasized that the plaintiff
told the Social Security Administration she no longer could fulfill her

210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 607, 609.
526 U.S. 795, 807 (1999).
See discussion supra Part III.B.
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"regular" job description due to her condition. 2 14 This statement did
not create an inconsistency; that she no longer could perform her
regular job description demonstrated "precisely why she [was]
requesting an accommodation." 215 The Seventh Circuit, however,
rejected similar reasoning in Lee v. City of Salem. The plaintiff argued
that he applied for SSDI because it had been "hammered into his
head" that his condition left him unable to work. 216 The court
responded that although Cleveland allows ADA plaintiffs to rely on
their "good faith belief' in their assertions to the Administration,
allowing them to resolve inconsistencies with such explanations would
permit "hopping from forum to forum, making contradictory assertions
under oath."217 In a more recent case, a district court similarly opined
that Cleveland does not allow ADA plaintiffs to rest on good faith by
arguing that they applied for public support under the belief that they
had no choice because of their employers' denial of accommodations. 2 18
This creates the danger of allowing ADA plaintiffs to explain their
"false statement[s] in an earlier application for SSDI benefits." 219 Yet,
at this Note shows, these statements may not have been false but
rather grounded in SSDI applicants' good faith beliefs. By binding
these plaintiffs to their prior beliefs and precluding an inquiry into the
alleged unlawfulness of employers' actions and beliefs, courts risk
denigrating the ADA's purpose of redressing discrimination.
Finally, a careful application of Cleveland should incorporate
the administrative realities of SSDI applications. Because the Social
Security Administration processes roughly four million disability
claims per year 220 through a standardized process, the disability-onset
date given in an application should not be narrowly construed to
preclude job qualification. Listing the final date of employment as the
date on which one became unable-to work may reflect an employer's
unlawful denial of accommodations. Applicants' health conditions may
have deteriorated since their last day of work, yet they
understandably list a termination date when applying for benefits
predicated on lack of employment. Cleveland recognized that

214. 440 F.3d at 609.
215. Id.
216. Lee v. City of Salem, 259 F.3d 667, 668 (7th Cir. 2001).
217. Id. at 677.
218. Butler v. Vill. of Round Lake Police Dep't, No. 06 C 3366, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80077,
at *12 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 8,2008).
219. Id. (emphasis added).
220. Social Security Disability Determination Process Improvements: Hearing Before H.
Subcomm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Andrew Marioni, President,
National Council of Disability Determination Directors).

1280

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:4:1245

conditions change: "[A] statement about that disability at the time of
an [SSDI] application.. . may not reflect an individual's capacities at
the time of the relevant employment decision." 22 1 In EEOC v. StowePharr Mills, Inc., the Fourth Circuit addressed how the
administrative context of SSDI claims affects the dates that applicants
provide. 2 22 Although the plaintiff applied for SSDI four months after
her termination, she listed a pre-termination disability date on the
advice of the Administration intake officer. 22 3 The court found that the
advice of the intake officer and the boilerplate language of the
application sufficiently resolved the contradiction. 224 Other courts,
however, strictly bind plaintiffs to job qualification as of the date
listed in SSDI applications. 225 Allowing plaintiffs to explain the beliefs
and context underlying the date is more aligned with the standardized
nature of the SSDI process and the relationship-specific nature of the

ADA.
Another administrative reality of SSDI is that the
226
Administration denies the majority of initial applications.
Accordingly, many claimants appeal. 227 In judicially estopping ADA
claims, some courts underscore plaintiffs' repeated averments of
inability to work during the appeal process. 228 Courts may give extra

221. 526 U.S. 795, 805 (1999).
222. 216 F.3d 373, 376, 379 (4th Cir. 2000).
223. Id. at 376.
224. Id. at 379.
225. See cases cited supra notes 154-55.
226. 2007 ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 135 chart
11,
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/di.asr/2007/sectO4.pdf.
227. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., OFFICE OF RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY POLICY, ANNUAL STATISTICAL
SUPPLEMENT, 2007, at 2.68 tbl. 2.F9 (2008), http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/
supplement/2007/2f8-2fl 1.pdf.
228. See, e.g., D'Ambrosia v. Pa. Chamber of Bus. & Indus., No. 1:06-CV-2182, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 77147, at *12 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2008) ("Plaintiff did not reiterate his claim of total
disability to the SSA in multiple attempts to receive benefits. Rather, Plaintiff applied once over
the phone ....
");Bisker v. GGS Info. Servs., Inc., No. 1:CV-07-1465, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
73310, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2008) ("In her appeal, the Plaintiff asserted again that she was
'unable to work,' and she requested an opportunity to explain 'how [her] impairments prevent
[her] from working.' "); Shafnisky v. Bell Atl., Inc., No. 01-3044, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21829, at
*15 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2002) ("Plaintiff did not merely make a blanket statement or simply check a
box on a form. She claimed to be totally disabled repeatedly to various parties throughout the
pertinent period."); Lorde v. City of Philadelphia, No. 98-5267, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17196, at
*7-8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2000) (emphasizing that the plaintiff repeatedly asserted that she was
unable to work during her SSDI appeal); Ward v. Washington Mills, 92 F. Supp. 2d 168, 173-74
(W.D.N.Y. 2000) (emphasizing plaintiffs repeated assertions to the SSA); see also Detz v. Greiner
Indus., Inc., 346 F.3d 109, 119 (3d Cir. 2003) (granting summary judgment to an employer on an
ADEA claim and stressing that plaintiff "repeated his original statements regarding his
disability and his inability to work"); Depauw v. Ingersoll-Rand, No. 06-cv-1161, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 75249, at *20 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2007) (granting summary judgment to an employer on an
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weight to an appeal record that includes physicians' statements that
the plaintiff cannot work. 229 Yet emphasizing repeated assertions still
risks overlooking the employer's discriminatory beliefs and actions. If
an employer leads an employee to believe that he or she cannot be
accommodated in the workplace, it makes sense to repeat this belief to
the Social Security Administration. Further, physicians may be
unaware of possible accommodations. The disability-onset date
problem also arises in SSDI appeals. If an applicant's condition has
worsened during the appeal, the Administration may reverse its
denial and award SSDI retroactive to the initial date listed on the
application. 23 0 Again, courts should not be quick to label the eligibility
date as the date on which a plaintiff became "officially" disqualified
under the ADA.
Critics may argue that this solution eviscerates Cleveland's
recognition that there are situations in which SSDI awards and ADA
claims genuinely conflict. Exceptional application of judicial estoppel
seems to allow employment discrimination plaintiffs to win damages
based on sworn contrary assertions. However, a true conflict between
SSDI benefits and an ADA claim is exceptional. Post-Cleveland
analyses tend to focus on semantic differences between the statutes
and the instinctive offense of "double recovery," rather than the
possibility of unlawful discrimination within a particular employment
relationship. More importantly, judicial estoppel should be an
exceptional remedy. It should deter true offense to judicial factfinding
rather than punish plaintiffs' confusion amidst statutory conflicts,
administrative bureaucracy, and the challenge of supporting
themselves when employers deny support. Applying for a minimal
level of government support following a job loss and later filing an
uncertain (and likely doomed) ADA claim is simply not the egregious
"double dipping" that some courts and employers' counsel often assert.
V. CONCLUSION
If courts focus their Cleveland analyses on the employeremployee relationship at issue and whether the employee requested

ADEA claim and noting that plaintiff "affirmatively pursued his [SSDI] claim by seeking review
before an Administrative Law Judge").
229. See, e.g., Voisin v. Georgia Gulf Corp., 245 F. Supp. 2d 853, 860 (M.D. La. 2002)
(emphasizing that the plaintiffs physician told the SSA that the plaintiff was "[u]nable to work
on a day-to-day sustained basis in full-time employment at any/all levels of exertion").
230. See, e.g., Felix v. New York City Transit Auth., 154 F. Supp. 2d 640, 652 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
("It is conceivable that [Plaintiffs] condition continued to progressively deteriorate so that she
was a 'qualified individual' as of [her termination date] but became totally disabled thereafter.").
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accommodations, plaintiffs receiving SSDI rarely should be judicially
estopped. It will be atypical for SSDI applications to indicate
affirmatively that not even the requested accommodation would have
enabled job performance. Even when such affirmative assertions are
present, a plausible resolution is that the requested accommodation
was denied, leading the plaintiff to seek disability benefits. Allowing
ADA claims to proceed under such circumstances does not convert
SSDI to "unemployment insurance"; it assures that the ADA is a
viable means of redress and deterrence.
If judicial estoppel is to be a rare remedy, one might ask why it
is even necessary given the availability of other defenses to employers
in ADA suits and the overwhelming success of those defenses. 231 Why
is highlighting the confusing interaction between the ADA and the
SSA appealing? If prior inconsistent statements are not a rarity in
litigation, 2 32 why such an extreme remedy for these particular
statements? For employers, the statutory intersection permits quick
disposal of an ADA claim. For courts, discussing the conflict perhaps
communicates frustration with Congress's failure to reconcile the
statutes. 233 Recent amendments to the ADA broadening the definition
of "disabled" may increase courts' temptation to apply judicial estoppel
as a shortcut around the expanded statute and the concomitant
increase in ADA claims. 234 Although the amendments broadened the
definition of "disabled," they did not alter the definition of "qualified
individual"; therefore the requirement that one be able to perform the
235
job with or without accommodations remains vital to an ADA claim.
Still, the categorical differences between the SSA and ADA may be
largely semantic and theoretical.23 6 The Ticket to Work program,
albeit a small part of the SSA, demonstrates an effort to harmonize
the two statutes; it shows that "disabled" under the SSA may be a
temporary status, contingent upon an employee's willingness to work

231. See sources cited supra note 1 and accompanying text (indicating that employers
prevailed in 212 of 272 federal cases).
232. Norris v. Sysco Corp., 191 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 1999) ("[P]roof that a party... has
made prior inconsistent statements is not a rare event in our courts. Juries are regularly called
upon to consider evidence of that sort .... ).
233. See Paul Armstrong, Toward a Unified and Reciprocal Disability System, 25 J. NAT'L
ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 157, 188-89 (2005); Diller, supra note 15, at 1080-81 (calling for unified
disability laws).
234. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
235. See PractitionersShould be Wary of Unusual EEOC Decisions, FEDERAL EEO ADVISOR,
Feb. 1, 2009 (arguing that because of the ADA amendments, the "focus of [ADA litigation] will
shift away from the definition of disability and toward whether employers complied with their
obligations").
236. Diller, supra note 15, at 1009.
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and an employer's willingness to make accommodations. The
program's low participation rate237 will not improve unless SSDI
recipients can rely on the ADA as a means to redress employment
barriers.
A more harmful message communicated by judicial estoppel is
that by removing themselves from the workplace and receiving SSDI,
ADA plaintiffs forfeit their right to redress the discriminatory actions
of their employers. Strictly binding ADA plaintiffs to fixed
descriptions of conditions in SSDI applications obscures the beliefs
and actions that motivated the statements. SSDI recipients may not
view their benefits as reflecting a permanent and complete inability to
work, but rather as the government's recognition that gainful
employment depends on the willing attitudes of employers. As the
Ninth Circuit observed, finding that the ADA and SSA can exist in
harmony may reflect the factfinder's "understanding about the
problems and dilemmas faced by injured workers as they confront
myriads of forms, demands, concepts, and needs." 238 By confining their
inquiry to the particular employer-employee relationship, courts will
signal that the diverse needs, beliefs, and actions experienced by
disabled individuals cannot be given fair hearing in an administrative
proceeding that focuses on a person and a condition. Supportive
employment requires a judicial forum, a forum willing to focus on a
person and the employer who may have influenced that person's
beliefs about his or her capabilities.
Lauren Lowe*

237. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (indicating a six percent rate).
238. Norris v. Sysco Corp., 191 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 1999).
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